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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
interstate commerce; just because gas in a particular sale ulti-
mately flows into interstate transportation is no reason to sub-
ject the sale to federal regulation. Hence, any rate regulation
which is reasonably linked to the administration of such con-
servation, and which does not interfere with interstate transpor-
tation of gas, should remain within the jurisdiction of the states.
The regulation of wellhead sales would seem to be reasonable
state action where the regulation is necessary for conservation.
It would therefore appear that an interpretation of the Natural
Gas Act whereby all sales of gas in interstate commerce fall with-
in FPC jurisdiction is an unwarranted extension of jurisdiction.
John B. Hussey, Jr.
TORTS - LIABILITY FOR HARMFUL RELIANCE ON A GRATUITOUS
PROMISE
Plaintiff was scratched or bitten by defendant's cat while
shopping in defendant's store. Realizing that plaintiff would
have to take curative measures if the animal were rabid, the
parties agreed on the necessity of observing the cat for a stated
period, whereupon the defendant promised to insure such ob-
servation by locking up the cat. In the past, the animal had en-
joyed considerable freedom; but despite defendant's promise, he
made no change in his usual method of keeping the cat and it
disappeared a few days later before its condition could be ascer-
tained. The cat subsequently returned and proved not to be dis-
eased; but, during the interim, plaintiff, on the insistence of her
doctor, was compelled to submit to the only known cure for
rabies, the Pasteur treatment. After several injections, plaintiff
sustained injury from a noxious reaction to the vaccine serum.
In an action for damages, the trial court ruled for plaintiff, find-
ing that the defendant was under a duty to confine the cat for
observation. On appeal, the court of appeal held, affirmed. One,
under no initial duty to aid another, who undertakes by express
promise to act for the safety of the other, causing the other rea-
sonably to rely on performance of the undertaking and refrain
from acting for himself or from securing other available help, is
liable for bodily harm resulting from the failure to use reason-
able care in performing the undertaking. Marsalis v. LaSalle, 94
So.2d 120 (La. App. 1957).
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The question of liability in tort for harm caused by reliance
upon a gratuitous promise originally arose at common law in an
action of trespass on the case for assumpsit; hence the emphasis
was placed on an actual undertaking or entry upon performance,
because trespass did not lie where the defendant had not acted
affirmatively.' This concept, coupled with the requirement of
consideration for recovery on a promise,2 furnishes a historical
explanation for the holding in the leading American case of
Thorne v. Deas,3 where the plaintiff relied on defendant's gratui-
tous promise to procure insurance on plaintiff's vessel. The de-
fendant failed to perform as promised and plaintiff sustained
damages when the vessel was shipwrecked while uninsured. Not-
ing that nonfeasance did not constitute a tort and that assumpsit
would not lie for nonperformance of a promise in the absence of
consideration, the court concluded 4 that there could be no liabil-
ity for such nonperformance of a gratuitous promise. Instead,
the Chancellor said, there must be an undertaking,which, if per-
formed negligently, would be actionable even though done gratui-
tously. Although the Thorne line of reasoning still remains, 5 it
must be viewed in the light of the subsequently developed con-
tractual doctrine of promissory estoppel." Moreover, the original
proposition requiring an undertaking has been weakened consid-
1. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 468-71, 637-40 (5th
ed. 1956).
2. Id. at 649; Seavey, Reliance upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct,
64 HARv. L. REV. 913-14 (1951) ; Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 164 (1932).
3. 4 Johns. 84 (N.Y. 1809).
4. "I have no fault to find with the Chancellor. He summarized the older
cases truthfully. These held with great uniformity that indebitatus assumpsit
would not lie for failure to perform a gratuitous promise." Seavey, Reliance upon
Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913 (1951), citing Ames,
History of Assumpsit, 2 HAzv. L. REV. 1, 53 (1888).
5. There are a number of cases following the reasoning of the Thorne case. A
few of them are Newton v. Brook, 134 Ala. 269, 32 So. 722 (1901) ; Brawn v.
Lyford, 103 Me. 362, 69 Atl. 544 (1907) ; Long v. Patterson, 198 Miss. 554, 22
So.2d 490 (1945) ; Miller v. Bennett, 237 Mo. App. 1285, 172 S.W.2d 960 (1943) ;
Tomko v. Sharp, 87 N.J.L. 385, 94 Atl. 793 (1915). None of these cases was
found to be overruled.
6. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932) : "A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance of a definite and sub-
stantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise."
Note also the expression in RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 378 (1933) : "One, who,
by a gratuitous promise or other conduct which he should realize will cause an-
other reasonably to rely upon the performance of definite acts of service by him
as the other's agent, causes the other to refrain from having such acts done by
other available means is subject to a duty to use care to perform such service or,
while other means are available, to give notice that he will not perform."
See, further, Seavey, Reliance upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64
HAre. L. REV. 913, 919, 925-28 (1951) ; Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV.
L. REV. 1236-38 (1937).
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erably by the readiness of later courts to find an undertaking.
This has been done in several cases, indicating that courts are
willing to hold a gratuitous promisor liable, but are unwilling to
depart from the established legal mold, thus utilizing the under-
taking element as a symbol rather than a basis for liability.7
While tort liability for harmful reliance on a gratuitous promise
is apparently res nova in Louisiana, the question has arisen in
other states, but there is a difference of opinion as to just what
the American decisions currently hold. The Restatement resolves
the matter affirmatively," while an eminent authority states
rather unequivocally in his recent hornbook that there is no such
liability.9
The court in the present case, without mention of the Thorne
decision, deduced its rule from basic tort principles, 10 beginning
with a statement of the well-settled principle that there is no af-
firmative duty to aid one in peril." An exception to this principle
7. Defendant attended an auction, but did not bid for plaintiff as he had
gratuitously promised to do. In holding defendant liable, the court found an under-
taking based on defendant's attendance at the auction. Kirby v. Brown, 229 App.
Div. 155, 241 N.Y. Supp. 255 (1st Dep't 1930).
Court found duty to maintain fence around canal based on defendant's erection
of the fence, although it was stated that defendant was under no duty to build the
fence. Taylor v. Roosevelt Irr. Dist., 72 Ariz. 160, 232 P.2d 107 (1951).
See also PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 186 (2d ed. 1955) ; McNiece & Thornton,
Affirmative Duties il Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272, 1281 (1949).
8. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 325 (1934) : "One who gratuitously undertakes with
another to do an act or to render services which he should recognize as necessary
to the other's bodily safety and thereby leads the other in reasonable reliance upon
the performance of such undertaking (a) to refrain from himself taking the neces-
sary steps to secure his safety or from securing the then available protective action
by third persons, or (b) to enter upon a course of conduct which is dangerous
unless the undertaking is carried out, is subject to liability to the other for bodily
harm resulting from the actor's failure to exercise reasonable care to carry out his
undertaking.
"Comment (a) The actor may undertake to do an act or to render services
either by an express promise to do so or by a course of conduct which the actor
should realize would lead the other into the reasonable belief that the act would be
done or the services rendered."
9. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 186 (2d ed. 1955) : "[I]t seems to be agreed
by everyone that a mere gratuitous promise to render assistance, with nothing
more, imposes no tort obligation even though the plaintiff may rely on the promise
and suffer damage because of his reliance." Of. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 196
(1941) : "[T]here is authority that where the defendant has reason to expect such
reliance to the plaintiff's detriment, even a mere gratuitous promise will be enough
to create a duty, for the breach of which a tort action will lie."
10. The court stated that the general basis for tort in Louisiana is Article
2315 of the Civil Code, quoting the article in part as follows: "Every act whatever
of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to
repair it." The basic elements of a tort action were presented as defined in sev-
eral Louisiana cases. However, no specific mention was made as to whether the
Civil Code articles provided a basis of liability any different from common law.
The court apparently thought they did not, because it quoted liberally from Ameri-
can common law decisions.
11. No Louisiana cases were cited in the opinion and none were found on this
proposition. However, consider the language in an old agency case: "No one is
NOTES
was recognized where one voluntarily undertakes to aid another
in distress. In support of this exception, the court cited the Re-
statement and cases from several jurisdictions saying that one
who aids another voluntarily is bound to use reasonable care,
when he has caused the other reasonably to rely upon the per-
formance of the undertaking.12 It was then emphasized that
plaintiff may have had other means of confining the cat, which
she did not utilize because she relied on the defendant's promise.
The court concluded that the exception was broad enough to in-
clude the defendant's action and that once the defendant prom-
ised to lock up the cat, causing plaintiff to rely upon the promise,
he was bound to use reasonable care. Finding further that the
defendant did not use reasonable care and that the Pasteur treat-
ment proved unnecessary, the court rendered judgment for plain-
tiff.
The present case offers a salutary rule which is consistent
with tort principles. If it is sound to allow recovery where one
has detrimentally relied upon an undertaking which was mani-
fested by performance or part performance, then relief should
also be afforded where the undertaking is manifested by an ex-
press promise. There may be a separate basis for liability in
cases similar to the instant one where an innocent creator of
danger is under a duty to aid another who is helpless in face of
that danger. 13 The present situation was different because the
plaintiff became helpless only when she relied on defendant's
bound to attend to the concerns of another, even when a compensation for the
trouble attends it; yet he who undertakes it, even gratuitously, is bound to in-
demnify the person whose business is undertaken from the consequences of the
agent's negligence." Montillet v. Bank of United States, 1 Mart. (N.S.) 365,
367 (La. 1823). There are many cases from other jurisdictions. The court cited
Plutner v. Silver Associates, Inc., 186 Misc. 1025, 61 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Mun. Ct.
1946) ; Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44 AtI. 809 (1898). See further
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 184, nn. 57-61 (2d ed. 1955).
12. Again, no Louisiana cases were cited and none were found. The court
quoted from decisions of several states at 94 So.2d 125. A few of the cases found
there are Owl Drug Co. v. Crandall, 52 Ariz. 322, 80 P.2d 952 (1938) ; Gates v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 185 Ky. 24, 213 S.W. 564 (1919) ; Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v.
Leflar, 168 Miss. 255, 150 So. 220 (1933). See further PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
184-86 (2d ed. 1955).
13. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 321 (1934): "If the actor does an act, which at
the time he has no reason to believe will involve an unreasonable risk of causing
bodily harm to another, but which, because of a change of circumstances or fuller
knowledge acquired by the actor, he subsequently realizes or should realize as
involving such a risk, the actor is under a duty to use reasonable care to prevent
the risk from taking effect." Cf. id. § 322 and Caveat.
"Where the original danger is created by innocent conduct, involving no fault
on the part of the defendant, it was formerly the rule that no such duty arose;
but this appears to have given way, in recent decisions, to a recognition of the




promise. Suppose, however, that the plaintiff had been a child
who was rendered helpless by his obvious ignorance concerning
rabies. In such a situation the court might well find that the
defendant, who has had an innocent part in creating the danger
of rabies, is under a duty to aid another who is helpless is face
of danger so created. Two Louisiana decisions involving rail-
roads indicate some support for such a basis of liability. In both
cases the plaintiff was an inebriate in danger of eventually being
struck by defendant's train, and each victim had been seen in
his predicament by employees of the railroad. Both cases held
that defendant was bound to take precautions to secure plaintiff
from danger.14
Fred R. Godwin
TORTS - MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY,- DuTy TO WARN
Plaintiff was struck in the eye by a rubber exerciser that
accidentally slipped off her foot while she was following instruc-
tions furnished by defendant manufacturer. Plaintiff sued in
tort, contending that the manufacturer failed to warn her of the
danger which caused her injury. In reviewing a summary judg-
ment for defendant, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, in a five to four decision, held, affirmed. A manu-
facturer is not under a duty to warn users of particular dangers
in prescribed uses of the product if the reasonably foreseeable
injuries from the use of the product are minor and the general
danger in using the product is obvious. The dissent maintained
that the manufacturer was liable for marketing a product ac-
companied by directions that contained no warning of danger
and which, when followed, resulted in injury to the user. The
dissent reasoned further that, although the propensity of rubber
to contract might be obvious, the danger in using a rubber exer-
ciser as directed by the manufacturer is not so obvious as to take
the question away from the jury. Jamieson v. Woodward &
Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1957).1
14. Kramer v. New Orleans City & L.R.R., 51 La. Ann. 1690, 26 So. 411
(1899) ; Grennon v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 120 So. 801 (La. App.
1929). Consider further the language in a more recent decision: "Everyone is
under the obligation, whether his role be that of an agent or owner, of not allow-
ing things subject to his control to injure another, either because of active or pas-
sive negligence, and whenever property in one's control becomes dangerous to third
persons, there is a duty to act affirmativelyj." (Emphasis added.) Washington v.
T. Smith & Son, 68 So.2d 337, 346 (La. App. 1953).
1. The suit was brought against the retailer and the manufacturer. The judg-
ment in favor of the retailer was unanimously affirmed. A portion of both the
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